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Bartnicki v. Vopper: Another Media

Victory or Ominous Warning of a
Potential Change in Supreme Court
First Amendment Jurisprudence?
In a recent event in Canada, two individuals engaged in a conversation via cellular
phones, in which they fabricated a story about a local radio station that would award a
prize to the first caller the following morning. The next morning, nine people who had
somehow monitored
the previous day's conversation phoned the radio station claiming
2
their prize.
Could this happen to you? If you think that your cellular phone
conversations are safe from interception and possible publication, you may want to think
again.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Advent of the CellularPhone
Once only conceivable in the imagination and James Bond movies,
gadgets such as cellular phones have now, through recent advances in
modem technology, become widely available to the public, 3 and it has been
estimated that there are currently over forty-five million cellular phones in
use in America alone.4 The Federal Communications Commission first
authorized the use of cellular phone services in 198 L' Cellular phones send
out radio transmissions that are received by "cells," honeycomb-shaped
segments within larger service areas that are equipped with transmitters that
can receive and send out messages within their parameters.6 When a call is
placed, a signal is sent through the air to a cell site and then to a mobile
telephone switching office (MTSO). v The cellular phone conversation is
then automatically switched by the MTSO from one station and one

3. See id.
4. Cellular Privacy: Is Anyone Listening? You Betcha!: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 2 (1997)
[hereinafter Hearing].
5. Shubert v. Metrophone, Inc., 898 F.2d 401, 402 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing S. REP. No. 99541, at 9 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3563).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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frequency to the next as the cell phone user moves about and the phone is

moved from cell to cell.8
Along with the advent of cellular phones, however, came new
challenges and concerns.9 One such concern was privacy and the disclosure
of confidential information about government activities,' 1 celebrities, or
one's own business competitors that could now be easily obtained through
scanners and interception technology." Congress understood this concern
and recognized that "[e]lectronic hardware making it possible for
overzealous law enforcement agencies, industrial spies and private parties to

intercept the personal or proprietary communications of others is readily
available in the American market ....

Cellular phone communications

are especially vulnerable to intrusion because simple, inexpensive radio
scanners that have been slightly modified can intercept cellular
transmissions. 13
Congress noted that digital technology has made
eavesdropping more difficult because the service provider can encrypt the
communications; however, it is not at all impossible to intercept digital
signals."1

Furthermore, protective measures have been developed to combat

the unauthorized interception of cellular communications, including
encryption, analog scrambling, authentication cards, and firewalls; however,

8. Id.
9. See Transcrypt International, supra note 1.
10. For example, years ago during the disastrous San Francisco earthquake, public safety officers
were forced to communicate via cellular phones, but the media intercepted and broadcast their
communications. Id. Additionally, during the tragic TWA disaster of some years back, government
agents had to stop using their cell phones after the media began intercepting their calls, which led to
various security problems and miscommunications between government agencies. Hearing,supra
note 4, at 181.
11. See Transcrypt International, supra note 1.
12. S.REP. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557.
13. H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 20 (1986). Interestingly, one can find numerous websites on the
Internet that give instructions on altering a scanner to intercept a cellular phone conversation.
Hearing, supra note 4, at 8. This type of information can also be found in many trade magazines
and other publications. Id. at 9. Recreational eavesdroppers even have their own magazine entitled
Monitoring Times, which boasts a circulation of 30,000. WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 223 n.2, at http:www.wws.princeton.edu/cgibin/byteserv.prl/-ota/diskl/1995/9547/954713.PDF (last visited Mar. 13, 2003) [hereinafter
WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES]. Furthermore, analog scanners are available for purchase at many retail
outlets and can sell for as little as eighty dollars. Hearing,supra note 4, at 181. Elaborate digital
scanners are considerably more expensive; however, the availability of inexpensive units will
improve as the demand for them increases with the rise in digital phone use. Id. The number of
scanners estimated to be in use in the United States is in the millions. Id. at 182.
14. Hearing,supra note 4, at 4, 6.
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these can be very expensive and will not always prevent the most
sophisticated of operators from intercepting cellular communications.1"
B. Congress Prohibits Interception of Cellular Transmissions and the
Supreme Court Responds
"Historically, the struggle over the privacy of communications has been
a battle between an individual's right to privacy and the legitimate needs of
law enforcement to conduct surveillance (wiretapping, interception) in the
investigation of crimes."1 6 Achieving balance in this regard has been
difficult for both Congress and the Supreme Court.' 7 Congress' first attempt
to regulate privacy in communication was codified in the Communications
Act of 1934.8 The Act made it illegal for anyone, except for law
enforcement personnel or communication company employees, to intercept
or disclose any private communication.19
Largely in response to two 1967 Supreme Court decisions, Katz v.
United States20 and Berger v. New York, 21 in which the Court struck down
specific wiretapping operations by law enforcement officers because they
violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable search and
seizure, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968.22 Title III of this Act (entitled Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance) had the stated purpose of "protecting the privacy of wire and
oral communications,,, 23 and it prohibited the interception of private
communications except under certain specified conditions where law
enforcement could obtain evidence through electronic surveillance.24 The
Act, as initially written, only applied to wire/landline communications;
however, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 modified
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to
include electronic communications (including cellular phone conversations)

15. See Transcrypt International, supra note 1. Encryption systems can range in cost from $300
to $1,000 per unit (with one unit being required at each end of a conversation), and, although an
encrypted transmission cannot be decoded while a conversation is taking place, signals can be
recorded and decoded at a later time. WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 13, at 230.
16. WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 13, at 227 box 10-2.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1995)).

19. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1995)).
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that it was a "search" under the Fourth Amendment when
police attached a recording device to the outside of a phone booth).

21.

388 U.S. 41 (1967) (holding that a New York statute allowing police to engage in

wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment).
22. WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES, supranote 13, at 227 box 10-2.
23. S. REP. NO. 1097, at 66 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153.
24. See WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 13, at 227 box 10-2.
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and expanded the scope of the Act by making it illegal to disclose the
contents of protected communications.25
C. Applying WiretappingStatutes to the Media
Countless Supreme Court decisions have settled the "general
proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by
the First Amendment, '2 6 and, "[Wor decades, the media [has] hid[den]
behind their First Amendment protection as if it were an impenetrable
shield. 2 7 The media has assumed that implied in the First Amendment right
to publish information is the right to gather that information through
whatever means necessary.28 The Supreme Court gave some support for this
notion when, in the 1972 case of Branzburg v. Hayes, it stated that the media
has "some" newsgathering rights, and that "news gathering does ... qualify
for First Amendment protection" because "without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated. '29 The
Court, however, did caution, "the First Amendment does not invalidate
every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement
of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability., 30 Despite this waming
by the Court, many members of the media still believe that laws of general
applicability do not, and should not, apply to them.31

25. Id. The only type of oral communication protected by the Act is one "uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2003).
26. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (holding that the First and Fourth
Amendments provide safeguards for the freedom of speech and press, and the media is protected
when it publishes criticism of a public official's conduct); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957) (arguing that speech and press are protected in order to assure the free exchange of
political and social ideas, and the press has a right to publish "'sentiments on the administration of
Government') (quoting I JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774)); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) (noting "it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind,
although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions"); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (claiming that "the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful
means.., is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system").
27. Karen E. Klein, The Legalities of Reporting the News, QUILL, Sept. 1, 2001, at 26, available
at 2001 WL 20072354.
28. Id.
29. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (holding that even though the media does
have some protection, a journalist could be ordered to testify before a grand jury as to the identity of
a confidential source).
30. Id. at 682.
31. Klein, supra note 27.

With the creation and enforcement of federal wiretapping statutes,
Congress and the courts have attempted to "hold invasive technology at bay
without handcuffing the news media," and this has forced the Supreme
Court to engage in a balancing act with privacy interests on one side and
freedom of the press on the other.32 Recently, the Supreme Court, in
Bartnicki v. Vopper,33 addressed the common situation in which a third party
illegally intercepts a cellular phone conversation, records it, and then
releases a tape of that conversation to the media.34 The holding in that case,
that "a stranger's illegal [interception] does not suffice to remove the First
Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern,, 35 was a
victory for the individual members of the media that were involved.36
As precedent, however, the narrow holding in Bartnicki "could have
repercussions for the media for decades to come, 37 and might very well be
"a gift to the media with strings attached. Or, more precisely, it might be the
last gift to the media from the Supreme Court for a very long time., 3' This
is evidenced by the increased importance the Court placed on privacy, the
majority's reluctance to define exactly when, or if, a media defendant can
ever be punished for broadcasting the contents of an intercepted
conversation, and the Court's failure to address whether or not media
disclosures of gossip, trade secrets, or other private matters would be
protected.
Section II of this Note will discuss the holding of the majority of the
Court in Bartnicki v. Vopper, and will analyze the important concurring and
dissenting opinions of this landmark case. Section III will argue that the
narrow holding in Bartnicki might be less of a victory for the media than
was originally thought. Finally, Section IV will discuss how the decision in
Bartnicki has impacted two important, and similar, cases in the lower courts
and what the decision means for the media in the future.

32. Kenneth A. Paulson, Stolen Conversations and Freedom of the Press, at
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentlD= 14015 (May 27, 2001).
33. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). This was the first United States Supreme Court case to address the
freedom of the press in almost a decade. Tony Mauro, Press Freedom on the Line in Illegal Wiretap
Case, RECORDER, Dec. 6, 2000, at News 3.
34. Klein, supra note 27.
35. Bartnicki,532 U.S. at 535.
36. See Klein, supra note 27.

37. Id.
38. Tony Mauro, Presentfrom Justices May Signal End of Party, NEWS MEDIA & THE L., July 1,
2001, at 9.
39. See id.
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II.

BARTNICKI V. VOPPER

A. Summary of the Facts

Throughout 1992 and 1993, contract negotiations took place between
the Wyoming Valley West School District and the Wyoming Valley West
School District Teachers' Union.4 ° In May of 1993, Gloria Bartnicki, a chief
negotiator for the Teachers' Union, placed a cellular phone call to Anthony
F. Kane, the president of the Teachers' Union.4' During their conversation,
in which they discussed the negotiations, Kane said, "'If they're not going to
move for three percent, we're gonna have to go to their.., homes.., to
blow off their front porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those
guys .... -42 The communication was illegally intercepted by an unknown
source, and a tape of the conversation was anonymously delivered to Jack
Yocum, the leader of a local taxpayers' group that opposed the Teachers'
Union's proposals.43

Yocum then delivered the tape to Frederick W.

Vopper, a radio commentator, who aired the tape of the illegally intercepted
conversation on his talk show devoted to the discussion of public affairs.44
Bartnicki brought suit under federal wiretapping statute 18 U.S.C. §
2511(1)(c), which states that anyone who "'intentionally discloses, or
endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained through the [illegal] interception of a wire, oral, or
electronic communication ... shall be punished .. . . "4' Bartnicki also sued
Vopper under a similar Pennsylvania wiretapping statute and alleged that
Vopper violated the statutes when he knowingly disclosed the contents of

40. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1999), aff'd, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
41. Id. at 113.
42. Id. (quoting Appendix at 35-36).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 114 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(l)(c) (1999)). Section 251 1(l)(c) is part of Title Ill of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, entitled Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 523 (2001). Violations of this provision are
punishable by a fine, imprisonment for up to five years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(4)(a) (2003).
The District of Columbia and every state except for Arkansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Virginia, Vermont, and Washington have wiretapping laws that are similar to Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Associated Press, High Court Agrees to
Resolve Split in Lower Courts over Wiretap Laws, at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/
document.asp?documentlD= 12779 (June 26, 2000).

the illegally intercepted conversation. 46 After discovery, both parties moved
for summary judgment.47 Vopper argued, inter alia, that he had not violated
the wiretapping statutes because he had not been directly involved in the
illegal interception of the conversation. 48 He further argued that even if he
had violated the statutes in broadcasting the tape, the First Amendment
protected that broadcast.4 9
B. DistrictCourt Opinion
The district court found that direct involvement in the illegal
interception was not required to establish a violation of the wiretapping
statutes, and Vopper had violated the statutes when he intentionally
disclosed the contents of the phone conversation that he knew, or had reason
to know, had been illegally intercepted.50 The court went on to hold that the
First Amendment did not protect Vopper's broadcast because the statutes
involved were "content-neutral laws of general applicability that contained
'no indicia of prior restraint or the chilling of free speech."' 5 The district
court then approved a motion for an interlocutory appeal, which was
accepted by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 2
C. The Court ofAppeals Decision
The court of appeals agreed that the wiretapping statutes involved were
"content-neutral" and were thus subject to "intermediate scrutiny";53
however, the court remanded the case to the district court with instructions
to grant summary judgment for Vopper.5 4 The appellate court held that the
statutes involved were unconstitutional as applied to Vopper because they
"deter[red] significantly more speech than [was] necessary to serve the
government's asserted interest [in protecting privacy]." 55 The court was
concerned that media reporters would not always be certain of the "precise
origins of information they receive," or whether that information
"stem[med] from a lawful source. 56 A "cautious reporter," then, might

46. Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 113.
47. Id.
48. See id.
at 115.
49. See id.at 116.
50. Id.at 115.
51. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 521 (2001) (quoting Application to Petition for Certiorari
at 55a-56a, Bartnicki (No. 99-1687)).
52. See Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 113-14.
53. Id. at 123.
54. Id. at 129.
55. Id. at 126.
56. Id. at 127.
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choose not to report on a matter of public
concern for fear that he may
57
violate the wiretapping statutes in doing so.
In dissent, Judge Pollak argued that the prohibition against disclosing an
illegally intercepted conversation, above and beyond the prohibition against
the interception itself, was needed to reduce the incentive for engaging in
illegal interceptions and to prevent compounding the harm that would result
from such interceptions through wide dissemination.5"
D. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari59 and declared that its job was to
question "the validity of the statutes as applied to the specific facts of this
case." 60 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens, accepted that
the original interception was illegal and that Vopper knew, or should have
known, that the intercepted conversation had been obtained unlawfully. 6'
Therefore, when Yocum delivered the tape of the intercepted conversation to
the media defendant, and when Vopper then played the tape on the air, the
statutes in question were violated.62
The only remaining question facing the Court was "whether the
application of these statutes in such circumstances violate[d] the First
Amendment., 63 In this case, Vopper did not participate in the illegal
interception of the conversation, but instead only became aware of the
interception after it occurred.64
Furthermore, even though the initial
interception by an unknown person was unlawful, Vopper obtained access to
the tape of the recorded conversation in a lawful manner.65 Finally, the
intercepted conversation in this case involved a matter of public concern,
and the statements regarding the labor negotiations would have been
newsworthy if they had been made in 66
a public arena, or if they had been
inadvertently overheard by a third party.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
See id. at 133 (Pollack, J., dissenting).
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 522 (2001).
Id. at 524.
Id. at 525.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

The Court acknowledged that § 2511(1)(c) (and, by extension, the67
Pennsylvania statute) is a "content-neutral law of general applicability";
however, "the naked prohibition against disclosures is fairly characterized as
a regulation of pure speech. 68 Section 2511(l)(c) has the effect of
regulating speech because the goal of delivering a tape recording "is to
provide the recipient with the text of recorded statements,... and as such, it
is the kind of 'speech' that the First Amendment protects. 69 In this regard,

the Court agreed with the Third Circuit, which said, "'[i]f the acts of
"disclosing" and "publishing" information do not constitute
speech, it is
70
hard to imagine what does fall within that category."'
The Court went on to say that it is rarely constitutional for the
government to punish those who publish truthful information, and it has
been held on numerous occasions that, absent some great need, the
government may not punish those who publish truthful, and lawfully
obtained, information regarding a matter of public concern. 71 This
proposition, called the Daily Mail principle,72 holds that "'if a newspaper
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance[,]
then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
information, absent a need... of the highest order."' 73
The Court, however, refused "to answer categorically whether truthful
publication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment" and
limited the issue in this case to the question: "'[w]here the punished
publisher of information has obtained the information in question in a
manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully,
67. Id. at 526. The statutes are content-neutral because their purpose is to protect the privacy of
those engaging in wire, oral, or electronic communications, and the regulations do not single out
communications based on their subject matter, but only because they are illegally intercepted. Id. It
can be difficult to determine whether a specific regulation is content-neutral or content-based;
however, the general rule is that "laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored
speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994).
68. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526.
69. Id. at 527.
70. Id. (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 120 (3d Cir. 1999), aff'd, 532 U.S. 514
(2001)).
71. Id.at527-28.
72. This principle is made up of cases that have struck down statutes forbidding the media from
publishing certain types of truthful information as violative of the First Amendment. Id. at 545
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The cases that established this principle include FloridaStar v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524 (1989) (striking down a statute prohibiting the publication of the name of a rape
victim); Smith v. Daily Mail PublishingCo., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (striking down a statute prohibiting
publication of the name of a juvenile offender); Landmark Communications, Inc, v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829 (1978) (holding that a statute that prohibited publication of a state judicial review
proceeding violated the First Amendment); and Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975) (striking down an award of damages against a TV station for broadcasting a rape victim's
name in violation of a law forbidding the broadcast). Id.
73. Id. at 528 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
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may the government punish the ensuing publication of that information
based on the defect in the chain?"' 7 4 This refusal by the Court to discuss
whether a publisher of truthful information could ever be punished is
consistent with other cases in which the Court has "'carefully eschewed
reaching this ultimate question, mindful that the future may bring scenarios
which prudence counsels ...not resolving anticipatorily,"' and the Court
[swept] no more broadly
desired to instead rely "'on limited principles that
75
than the appropriate context of the instant case.'
The government argued that the wiretapping statutes at issue served two
interests-to eliminate the incentive to intercept private conversations and to
reduce the potential harm to those who fall victim to having their
conversations illegally intercepted.76 The Court recognized that these
interests justified the prohibition against the use of illegally obtained
information by the actual interceptor, but it did not follow that these
interests would be served by punishing the disclosure of information of
public concern that was lawfully obtained by one who was not involved in
the original illegal interception.77 It would be unreasonable, the Court
argued, to hold that a disclosure by a law-abiding possessor of important
information could "be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-lawabiding third party," because there is no real evidence to support the claim
that the prohibition against disclosures would actually reduce the amount of
illegal interceptions. 78 The Court contended that it could not be assumed
that punishing Vopper would deter the unknown original interceptor in this
79
case from continuing to engage in illegal interceptions of communications.
The Court acknowledged that the governmental interest in securing
privacy is an important and legitimate one, and one of the stated purposes of
the statutes involved was to protect privacy of communication and
encourage "'the uninhibited exchange of ideas and information among
private parties. ,,80 The Court admitted that "the fear of public disclosure of
private conversations might well have a chilling effect on private speech,"
and, therefore, the Court would have to weigh and consider important

74. Id. at 528-29 (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(Sentelle, J., dissenting), vacated by 532 U.S. 1050 (2001), remanded to No. 98-7156, 2001 U.S.

App. LEXIS 27798 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 2001) (per curiam)).
75. Id. at 529 (quoting FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 532-33).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 529-30.
79. Id. at 531.
80. Id. at 532 (quoting Brief for United States at 27).

interests "on both sides of the constitutional calculus."'" In balancing those
interests, the Court acknowledged "that some intrusions on privacy are more
offensive than others[;] ... disclosure of the contents of a private

conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the
interception itself," and this creates an important "justification for
prohibiting such disclosures by persons who 82lawfully obtained access to the
contents of an illegally intercepted message.
Despite this justification, however, the Court held that applying §
251 l(1)(c) to the present case "implicate[d] the core purposes of the First
Amendment because [the statute] impose[d] sanctions on the publication of
truthful information of public concern."83 The Court declared that "[i]n this
case, privacy concerns [had to] give way when balanced against the interest
in publishing matters of public importance," and "[o]ne of the costs
associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of
privacy., 84 The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit85 and held that "a stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to
remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public
concern." 86 Since the collective-bargaining negotiations between the School
District and the Teachers' Union were a matter of public concern, and
Bartnicki and Kane were engaged in a discussion about those negotiations,
the disclosure of that conversation by Vopper was protected by the First
Amendment to the Constitution.87
The Court did limit its holding, however, to matters of public concern
and refused to decide whether the interest in protecting the privacy of
communications was "strong enough to justify the application of § 2511 (c)
[sic] to disclosures of trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information
ofpurely private concern.""

1. Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, wrote a separate concurring
opinion agreeing with the majority's narrow holding on the specific facts,
but explaining that the Court's holding should not be used to "imply a
significantly broader constitutional immunity for the media., 89 Justice

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

87.

Id.

533.
533-34 (emphasis added).
534.
535.

88. Id. at 533 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 535-36 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Breyer acknowledged that the question put before the Court in this case
necessarily involved the balancing of conflicting constitutional concerns. 90
The statutes involved directly interfere with free expression because they
prohibit the media from publishing certain types of information, yet they
also protect privacy and foster private speech. 91
Justice Breyer suggested that in a situation like the one presented in this
case, where "important competing constitutional interests are implicated,"
the strictest scrutiny "with its strong presumption against constitutionality is
normally out of place," and it should instead be asked "whether the statutes
strike a reasonable balance between their speech-restricting and speechenhancing consequences, [o]r... instead impose restrictions on speech that
are disproportionate when measured against their corresponding privacy and
speech-related benefits. 92 Justice Breyer argued that even though the
statutes involved directly restrict speech, the "Constitution must tolerate
laws of this kind because of the importance of [their] privacy and speechrelated objectives," and, instead of broadly prohibiting these statutes, "the
Constitution demands legislative efforts to tailor the laws in order
reasonably
to reconcile media freedom with personal, speech-related
' 93
privacy.
Justice Breyer claimed that the wiretapping statutes, as applied to the
specific facts of this case, did not reasonably balance the conflicting
constitutional objectives involved, but instead "disproportionately
interfere[d] with media freedom" because Vopper did not participate in, or
encourage, the illegal interception, and did not engage in any unlawful
behavior other than to publish the information that had been illegally
obtained by an unknown third party.94 Furthermore, Bartnicki and Kane did
not have a legitimate privacy interest in their conversation because it
involved a threat to blow off front porches, which "thereby rais[ed] a
significant concern for the safety of others. 95 Justice Breyer stressed this
part of the intercepted conversation and noted that "[w]here publication of
private information constitutes a wrongful act, the law recognizes a privilege
allowing the reporting of threats to public safety," and this is true "[e]ven
where the danger may have passed by the time of publication" because
90. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 537-38 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring).

"editors, who must make a publication decision quickly, [should not] have to
determine present or continued danger before publishing this kind of
threat. 96 Finally, Justice Breyer noted that Bartnicki and Kane were public
figures who voluntarily placed themselves in a public controversy and,
therefore, were "subjected... to somewhat greater public scrutiny and had a
lesser interest in privacy than an individual engaged in purely private
affairs." 97
Justice Breyer was quick to say that the Constitution does not require
public figures to entirely give up the right to have private communications;
however, "the subject matter of the conversation at issue here [was] far
removed from that in situations where the media publicizes truly private
matters." 98 The constitutional privilege for the media to disclose illegally
obtained conversations of public concern does not, therefore, establish a
"'public interest' exception that swallows up the statutes' privacy-protecting
general rule. Rather, it finds constitutional protection for publication of
intercepted information of a special kind." 99 Enforcement of the statutes in
this case would disproportionately stifle media freedom because Bartnicki
and Kane had unusually low legitimate privacy expectations, while the
interest in defeating those expectations was extremely high.100 This, and the
fact that Vopper did not participate in the illegal interception, prevented
enforcement of the statutes in this case.' 0'
Justice Breyer went on to explain that the holding in this case should not
be extended beyond its specific facts, and the Court should "avoid adopting
overly broad or rigid constitutional rules, which would unnecessarily restrict
legislative flexibility.' 0 2 Since future technology could create challenges to
individual privacy, legislatures should be free to revisit wiretapping statutes
in order to create "better tailored provisions designed to encourage ... more
10 3
effective privacy-protecting technologies.'
2. Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas,
dissented. 0 4 The dissent focused on the privacy concerns raised by modem
technology that permits the interception of one's personal communications

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id.

100. id.
101. See id.

102. Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
103.

Id.

104. Id. (Rehnquist, C., dissenting).
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and records. 10 5 The majority held that the First Amendment protected the
disclosure of illegally intercepted conversations involving a matter of public
concern; however, the Court failed to even attempt to define what
constituted a matter of "public concern."' °6 This omission by the majority,
and the general holding of the Court, according to the dissent, "diminish[ed],
rather than enhanc[ed], the purposes of the First Amendment" and would
who rely upon
serve to "chill[] the speech of the millions of Americans
07
electronic technology to communicate each day."'
The dissent argued that the wiretapping statutes at issue in this case
were enacted with the purpose of protecting important speech and privacy
interests, and, even though the majority correctly labeled the statutes as
content-neutral, the Court "nonetheless subject[ed] these laws to the strict
scrutiny normally reserved for governmental attempts to censor different
viewpoints or ideas."' 1 8 These statutes regulate speech, and prohibit
disclosure of communications, without any reference to content, and "[t]he
same information, if obtained lawfully, could be published with
impunity."' 0 9 As such, the dissent argued, the wiretapping statutes only
needed to pass a test of intermediate scrutiny, and the majority's reliance on
the Daily Mail string of cases to justify applying a standard of strict scrutiny
was unpersuasive.'" The dissent argued that in each case establishing the
Daily Mail principle, the statutes at issue regulated the content of speech
(i.e., were content-based), which required the Court to apply a strict scrutiny
test.'
The dissent noted that the published information involved in the Daily
Mail string of cases had been lawfully obtained by the media defendants

105. Id.
106. Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id. The dissent noted that Congress, in drafting Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, recognized that privacy of communication is jeopardized by recent
technological developments, and it is no longer possible "'for each man to retreat into his home and
be left alone.'
Id. at 542-43 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 67
(1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154). "'[P]rivacy of communication is essential if
citizens are to think and act creatively and constructively. Fear or suspicion that one's speech is
being monitored by a stranger, even without the reality of such activity, can have a seriously
inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas."' Id. at 543
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 202 (1967)).
108. Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 544-45 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 545 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Daily Mail string of cases
referred to by the dissent, see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
11. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 545 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

from the government itself, while the present case involved a private
conversation that had not been intended for the public domain.1 2 Moreover,
the information published in the Daily Mail string of cases was already
available to the public, and punishing further publication would not have
furthered any government interest in confidentiality." 3 The reporters in the
Daily Mail cases obtained their information lawfully from public documents
and interviews. 114 In this case, however, "[the wiretapping] statutes only
prohibit 'disclos[ure],' and one cannot 'disclose' what is already in the
public domain.""' 5 Vopper committed an illegal act when he knowingly
disclosed the contents of the illegally intercepted conversation", 6 because the
communication was not publicly available and the parties involved had not
lost their privacy interests in the conversation."'
Finally, the Daily Mail cases were concerned with self-censorship and
the chilling of speech that could "'result from allowing the media to be
punished for publishing certain truthful information.""'1 8 In this case,
however, the fear of self-censorship was a reason for upholding the
wiretapping statutes at issue because they permit private communications to
take place without inhibition, and they only apply to "those who knowingly
disclose an illegally intercepted conversation."'' 9
The dissent posited that the Daily Mail cases did not really address the
issue involved in this case, which was "'whether, in cases where information
has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, the govemment
may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing
publication as well."" 2 Since the Daily Mail principle could not apply to
this case, the wiretapping statutes involved should have been "upheld if they
further[ed] a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression
of free speech. ,' 2 ' In the dissent's view, the statutes did just that-they
furthered the governmental interest in protecting the privacy of
communication. 12

112. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent noted that in FloridaStar v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 535 (1989), and Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841 n.12
(1978), the respective states could have implemented measures to protect the confidentiality of the
published information if they had so desired, but the parties in the present case could not have
prevented the interception of their cellular communication. Id.
113. Id. (citing FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 535).
114. Id. at 548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
116. See id. at 548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 546 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 547 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 535).
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 535 n.8).
121. Id. at 548-49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
122. See id.
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The dissent further noted that prohibiting the knowing publication of an
illegally intercepted conversation would serve to "deter the initial
interception itself, a crime which is extremely difficult to detect.' ' 123 The
majority claimed that Congress had failed, in their defense of § 2511 (1)(c),
to provide any evidence that the anti-disclosure provision had actually
reduced, or would reduce, the amount of illegal interceptions. 124 The dissent
argued, however, that courts have a duty to give "substantial deference" to
the predictions and judgments of Congress because Congress is best
equipped to analyze the data on complex issues, and "'[s]ound policymaking
often requires legislators to forecast future events and to anticipate the likely
impact of these events based on deductions and
inferences for which
125
complete empirical support may be unavailable.""
Furthermore, the dissent argued, the notion that illegal acts that are
difficult to prevent can be deterred by keeping the wrongdoer from getting to
enjoy the fruits of the crime, also called the "dry up the market" theory, is
"neither novel nor implausible. It is a time-tested theory that undergirds
numerous laws .... ,, 26 Without the prohibition against the knowing
disclosure of illegally intercepted conversations, an "eavesdropper ... could
anonymously launder [an] interception through a third party and thereby
avoid detection. Indeed, demand for illegally obtained private information
would only increase if it could be disclosed without repercussion. The law
against interceptions, which the Court agree[d] is valid, would be utterly
ineffectual without these anti-disclosure provisions."' 127 The majority did not
"explain how or from where Congress should obtain statistical evidence
about the effectiveness of these laws,"' 128 and the Court's decision to strike
down the statutes was simply a "bald substitution of its own
prognostications in place of the reasoned judgment of... legislative bodies
and the United States Congress," when reliance on the "dry up the market"
theory would have been more appropriate because it is "'far stronger than
129
mere speculation.""

123. Id. at 549 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 550 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in briginal) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 551 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 552-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Treasury Employees, 513
U.S. 454, 475 (1995)).

The dissent also argued that it is necessary for people to have the right
not to have to speak publicly, and one should feel free to speak into a phone
and assume that his words will not be broadcast. 130 The statutes involved in
this case serve to deter interceptions and disclosures of communications,
thereby protecting this revered right of privacy.13' The statutes "further the
First Amendment rights of the parties to the conversation" in that they
"further the 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' speech of the private
parties.' 32 Furthermore, it was argued that the wiretapping statutes at issue
in this case serve to "protect millions of people who communicate
electronically on a daily basis," while the statutes struck down in the Daily
protected "the identities and actions of a select
Mail string of cases only
' 33
group of individuals."'
Finally, the dissent admitted that the majority was correct in stating that
the statements made by Kane and Bartnicki would have been newsworthy if
they had been made in a public arena. 34 The crucial factor in this case,
however, was that Bartnicki and Kane "had no intention of contributing to a
public 'debate' at all, and it [was] perverse to hold that another's unlawful
interception and knowing disclosure of their conversation [was] speech
'worthy of constitutional protection.""' 135 The Constitution, according to the
dissent, "should not protect the involuntary broadcast of personal
conversations," and this should be true "[e]ven where the communications
involve public figures or concern public matters, [because] the conversations
are nonetheless private and worthy of protection."'' 36 Public figures may not
be free from public scrutiny in certain areas; however, this does not mean
"that they also have abandoned their right to have a private conversation
without fear of it being intentionally intercepted and knowingly
disclosed."'' 3 7 Certainly, the dissent concluded, the interest in privacy "at its
narrowest must embrace the right to be free from surreptitious

130. Id. at 553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, who joined in the dissent, suggested
during oral arguments that private speech would be chilled, and people would be more reluctant to
communicate through cell phones, if they knew that their conversations could be broadcast with
impunity. Tony Mauro, Press Freedom on the Line in Illegal Wiretap Case, RECORDER, Dec. 6,

2000, at 3. It is also interesting to note that Justice Scalia "never uses his wireless phone at home to
discuss court matters for fear his remarks will be intercepted and published." Id.
131. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 553-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964)).
133. Id. at 554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent noted that there are 49.1 million cellular
phones currently in operation, and "[t]he chilling effect of the Court's decision upon ... private
conversations will surely be great." Id. (citing Sean Hao, Nokia Profitsfrom Surge in Cell Phones,
FLA. TODAY, July 18, 1999, at El).
134. Id.

135. Id.
136. Id. at 554-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
137.

Id. at 555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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eavesdropping on, and involuntary broadcast of, our cellular telephone
conversations."138
III.

BARTNICKI V. VOPPER MAY NOT REALLY BE THE SWEEPING VICTORY
FOR THE MEDIA AND FIRST AMENDMENT IT SEEMS TO BE

At first blush, it would appear that the holding in Bartnicki v. Vopper
was a sweeping victory for media defendants everywhere because it upheld
the news media's right to publish information illegally obtained by a third
party.139 The press does not seem to be the only winner in this case, either,
because the holding implies that private citizens can continue to legally
"share with the public, the press or public officials information about threats,
crime or corruption," as long as they receive the information legally. 140 Yes,
it would seem that in the opinion, the majority in Bartnicki v. Vopper
"avoided what could have been a very troubling precedent allowing the
government to suppress... truthful speech about matters of public
importance based on the notion that misconduct in obtaining that
information had tainted the information itself' and, instead, implemented a
balancing test that weighed the First Amendment right to publish truthful
information of public concern against the interest in securing privacy.'41
It remains to be seen, however, "whether the Court laid the proper
groundwork for a fair balancing of these competing interests in future
cases."' 142 The concurring opinion of Justices Breyer and O'Connor, the
increased importance the Court placed on privacy, Justice Stevens'
declaration that the First Amendment would not apply to protect the
disclosure of trade secrets, gossip, or other purely private matters, and the
Court's refusal to resolve the question of if,and when, the media may ever
be punished for publishing truthful information all suggest that the press still
remains exposed to lawsuits, and the very real threat of liability continues to
43
loom. 1

138. Id.
139. Paulson, supranote 32.
140. See Paul McMasters,
Will Supreme Court Give Primacy to Privacy?, at
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentlD=12973 (Jan. 4, 2001).
141. Paul M. Smith & Nory Miller, When Can the Courts Penalize the Press Based on
Newsgathering Misconduct?, 19 COMM. LAW. 1, 1 (Summer 2001).
142. Id.
143. See id. at 1,27.
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A. The ConcurringOpinion
The ruling in Bartnicki was extremely narrow and "suggest[ed] that as
technology becomes more advanced and more invasive, the Supreme Court
may well conclude that illegally obtained information-even information in
the public interest-may not be shared with the public."1 44 This is evidenced
in the concurring opinion of Justices Breyer and O'Connor, which argued
that intercepting a marginally secure cellular phone conversation "'is a very
different matter from eavesdropping on encrypted cellular phone
conversations or those carried on in the bedroom. But the technologies that
allow the former may come to permit the latter,"' and if more invasive
technology is used in intercepting a conversation in the future, a different
conclusion might be reached."14 If this type of situation were to present
itself in the future, and if Justice Breyer and Justice O'Connor then joined in
the opinion of the dissent, it could result in a majority of the Court holding
"that the right to personal privacy should
limit the rights of a free press to
' 46
report on matters of public interest. ,
Furthermore, and most importantly, the concurring Justices stressed the
fact that they were not in favor of a free-speech right to disclose gossip
regarding a person's private affairs, but only upheld "constitutional
' 47
protection for publication of intercepted information of a special kind."'
The point was stressed that the Court was not "[creating] a 'public interest'
exception that swallow[ed] up the statutes' privacy-protecting general
rule,' ' 148 and the concurring Justices only joined in the holding of the
majority because "the information publicized involved a matter of unusual
public concern, namely a threat of potential physical harm to others.' 49
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, acknowledged that Bartnicki
and Kane were public figures who had voluntarily involved themselves in a
public controversy; however, they concurred in the judgment because the
plaintiffs did not have a "legitimate privacy interest in keeping secret a
conversation containing threats of violence."'' 50 This suggests that if the
subject matter of the conversation had contained information of public
concem, but did not contain threats of physical violence, the two concurring
Justices might have joined with the dissent to tum the
holding of the Court
5
toward a finding of liability for the media defendant.' '
144. Paulson, supra note 32.
145. Id. (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 541 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
146. Id.
147. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 535-36 (Breyer, J., concurring).
150. Smith & Miller, supra note 141, at 28 (citing Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
151.
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B. The IncreasedImportancethe CourtPlacedon Privacy
The Court has shown in previous decisions that it understands and
enforces the First Amendment's Free Press Clause; however, "[t]he biggest
threat to that constitutional trend line is the increasing potency of privacy as
a principle in the [C]ourt's jurisprudence."' 52 The majority in Bartnicki gave
the interest in protecting privacy nearly the same amount of weight as it gave
the freedom of the press.'53 Every member of the Court acknowledged the
importance of individual privacy, and the majority opinion did contain
ominous language that suggested that if the contents of the conversation at
issue had been even a little bit less newsworthy, the outcome might have
been very different. 54 The Court recognized the need for freedom of the
press, but also noted that the protection of privacy was an essential and
important goal of the government. 55 Justices Breyer and O'Connor, in their
concurring opinion, exhibited even less concern for the media interest at
stake and "expressed concern about the loss of privacy in phone
conversations. ' 16 Justice Breyer declared that the Constitution tolerates
laws that protect privacy and "demands legislative efforts to tailor the laws
in order reasonably to reconcile media freedom with personal, speechrelated privacy." 151
Furthermore, when the Court noted that "'there [were] important
interests to be considered on both sides of the constitutional calculus,"' the
majority approvingly discussed, without acknowledging that it was doing so,
Justice Breyer's commonly voiced idea that it is acceptable for the
58
government to restrict some speech in order to promote other speech.
152. Mauro, supra note 38, at 9. Bartnicki v. Vopper is the only recent Supreme Court case to
address classic First Amendment rights of the media; however, there have been other recent cases in
which privacy has won out over other interests. Id. A few of these cases are Reno v. Condon, 528
U.S. 141 (2000) (supporting the privacy of information contained on drivers' licenses); Los Angeles
Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing,528 U.S. 32 (1999) (discussing the commercial
use of information found on police blotters); and Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (holding that
it violated the Fourth Amendment for members of the media to be in a home during the execution of
a search warrant). Id. These cases were not direct First Amendment cases; however, in all of them,
the Court, "with a nod toward the privacy interests that were asserted,... shut the door on public
access. The press lost, even if indirectly." Id.
153. Id.
154. Tony Mauro, Odd Lot of Cases Tends to Favor First Amendment, at
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=14397 (July 16, 2001).
155. Tony Mauro, Press Rights Outweigh Privacy in Wiretapping Case, Justices Find, at
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentD= 13976 (May 22, 2001).
156. Mauro, supra note 38, at 9.
157. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 538 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
158. John P. Elwood, What Were They Thinking: The Supreme Court in Revue, October Term

Bartnicki is the first case in which the Court has, in a majority opinion,
endorsed this so-called "speech-trading theory," and this implies that the
Court may be leaning towards a more favorable view of restricting speech in
certain situations where doing so could encourage and protect other types of
speech.' 59
C. The Court Denied FirstAmendment Protectionto the Disclosureof
Trade Secrets, Gossip, or Other PrivateMatters, but Failedto Clearly
Define These Terms

Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, expressed the view that the
disclosure of information of public concern outweighed privacy interests in
this case; however, he implied that if a case were to involve the broadcast of
illegally intercepted "trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information of
purely private concern," the interest in privacy might prevail. 160 However,
"[t]he line between public and private concern is scarcely self-executing,"
and difficulty and uncertainty lies in determining what in fact constitutes a
matter of public concern.' 6' If one defines a matter of public concern as any
piece of information that the public would have an interest in knowing, what
Justice Stevens excluded as "domestic gossip" would have to be designated
a matter of public concern, if those involved were
celebrities, because the
62
public is very curious as to their private affairs.'
Moreover, the distinction that Justice Stevens drew between "trade secrets"
and matters of public concern can be hard to define. 63 It is obvious that a
product's secret formula should be protected from publication as a "trade
secret," but "what if the secret involves ... a confidential practice that

consumers would strongly object to or that is illegal?"' 64 Should this type of
disclosure "be treated as a (punishable) betrayal of a trade secret or as a
(protected) matter of public importance?" 6 5 The Court did not give much
guidance in this area within the Bartnicki opinion, and it remains to be seen
how courts will define "trade secrets" and "domestic gossip" in future
166
cases.

2000, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 365, 372 (2001) (quoting Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533); see, e.g., Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
159. See Elwood, supra note 158, at 372.
160. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533.
161. Smith & Miller, supra note 141, at 29.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 29-30.
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D. The Court Refused to Answer ifthe Media Can Ever Be Punished
forPublishingTruthful Information
In Bartnicki, the Court expressly limited its holding to the facts before it
and did not address whether the Constitution would protect a media
defendant who had participated in the initial illegal interception.I67 The
Court, in declining to address this situation, remained true to its "repeated
publication may ever be
refusal to answer categorically whether truthful
' 68
punished consistent with the First Amendment."'
Justice Stevens' majority opinion surely implied that press involvement
of any kind in the initial illegal interception would suffice to justify a finding
of liability. 69 The majority did not formally address the issue; however, it
did stress the fact, many times throughout the opinion, that the media
defendant in Bartnicki had not participated in the illegal interception. "0
This seems to suggest that the Court would hold a media defendant liable for
an ensuing publication if he had participated in the illegal interception,
regardless of the type of 71information involved or the circumstances
surrounding the interception.'
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE HOLDING IN BARTNICKI V. VOPPER

In the midst of the clash between the right to privacy and the right of the
media to publish truthful information of public concern, Bartnicki did
establish one clear rule: media defendants cannot be punished for publishing
the contents of an illegally intercepted conversation as long as the
information is a matter of public importance and the media did not
encourage or take part in the illegal interception.' 72 "The parameters of
these... important qualifications remain unclear"; 73 however, "the Court's
[narrow holding] in Bartnicki may provide guidance in [situations similar to
those presented]74in two [other] cases," Boehner v. McDermott and Peavy v.
WFAA-TV, Inc. 1

167. Id. at 28.
168. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001).
169. See Smith & Miller, supranote 141, at 29.
170. Id.
1171. Id.
172. Karen N. Frederiksen, The Supreme Court, the Press, and Illegally Recorded Cellular Telephone Calls,
28 HUM. RTS. 17, 17 (Fall 2001).
173. Id.
174. Klein, supra note 27.
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A. Boehner v. McDermott

75

1. The Facts
The Martins, a Florida couple, used a radio scanner to illegally intercept
and record a conference call between Republican Representative John A.
Boehner and other representatives of the Republican Party leadership, in
which they discussed an investigation by the Ethics Subcommittee of thenSpeaker of the House Newt Gingrich.176 The Martins turned over the tape of
the conversation to James A. McDermott, the then-ranking Democratic
member of the House Ethics Committee, with a letter explaining that the
conversation had been intercepted using a scanner. 77 McDermott then
turned the tape over to the New York Times and several other newspapers,
which then published verbatim transcripts of the conversation. 178 Boehner
then brought
suit under federal wiretapping statute 18 U.S.C. §
79
251 1(1)(C).
2. The Court of Appeals Decision
The trial court held that § 251 l(1)(c), as applied to this case, violated the
First Amendment because the conversation involved a matter of public
concern, and McDermott obtained the tape recording legally.' 80 However,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the ruling
of the trial court on the ground that McDermott did not engage in speech
when he delivered the recorded conversation to the newspapers and was,
therefore, not protected under the First Amendment.' 8' The court claimed
that "those who expose private activity to public gaze are not necessarily
engaging in speech, let alone 'the freedom of speech,"' and, while the
contents of the tape contained "speech," the speech was not that of
McDermott's. 112 The court held that it was McDermott's conduct in handing
the tape over to the press that caused him to be liable under § 2511 (1)(c)
because he "'caused a copy of the tape' to be given to the newspapers;
and.., he 'did so intentionally and with knowledge and reason to183know that
the recorded phone conversation had been illegally intercepted.""
175. 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated by 532 U.S. 1050 (2001), remandedto No. 98-7156,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27798 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 2001) (per curiam).
176. ld. at 465.
177. Id.
178.

Id.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.at 464.
Id. at 466.
Id.
Id. at 467 (quoting Complaint at 20).
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The court went on to say that even if McDermott had engaged in
"speech," there was, at best, a combination of "speech" and "non-speech"
elements in his conduct. 18 4 The Supreme Court held, in United States v.
O'Brien,185 that, in these types of situations, "'a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."",186 The test given in
O'Brien states that a regulation on speech is justified if: (1) it falls within a
power given to the government by the Constitution; (2) it advances an
important governmental interest, but does not directly relate to suppression
of free speech; and (3) the restriction on free speech is no more severe than
is necessary to advance that governmental interest. 87 The court analyzed
the facts of the case and held that § 251 l(1)(c) could be upheld under the test
laid out in O'Brien because the statute serves the important governmental
interest of protecting privacy of communication; it does not restrict speech,
but actually promotes it through the prohibition on intercepting
conversations and disclosing them; and it helps to deter illegal interceptions
and "dry up the market" for them.' 88
Furthermore, the court concluded that the minor restriction on speech
that is imposed by § 251 l(1)(c) is not any more severe than what is essential
for the advancement of the governmental interest involved. 89 It would not
have been enough for Congress "to prohibit disclosure only by those who
conduct the unlawful eavesdropping. One would not expect [illegal
interceptors] to reveal publicly the contents of the communication...
[because] they would risk incriminating themselves. It was therefore
'essential' for Congress to impose upon ...those not responsible for the
'' 9
interception, a duty of nondisclosure. 0
McDermott argued that he could not be punished under the statute
because the Daily Mail principle protects the disclosure of lawfully obtained
truthful information of public concern.' 91 The trial court had accepted this
argument because it felt it had no other choice; however, the court of appeals
felt this theory left the government without any method of preventing public
disclosure of private information. 92 The court distinguished FloridaStar v.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Boehner, 191 F.3d at 467 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
Id. at 468 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
Id. at 468-69.
Id.at 470.
Id.
Id.
Id. at470-71.

B.J.F. and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. to determine that their
principles did not really apply to this case.1 93 For example, in FloridaStar,
the government itself made a rape victim's name available to the media by
including it in a police blotter that was available to the public.194 The
government could have taken steps to prevent the release of that information
if it had desired to keep it private, and, even though a Florida statute made
media disclosure of a rape victim's name unlawful, the media had a right to
assume that "the government 'considered dissemination lawful' because the
information stemmed from a 'government news release."" 195 In the present
case, however, the intercepted conversation was not publicly available prior
to McDermott's disclosure, and McDermott knew that the Martins had
obtained the recording of the conversation unlawfully.' 96
The court further argued that the Supreme Court made clear that its
opinion in Florida Star was meant to be narrow and was not intended to
"declare a universal First Amendment principle," because future situations
could arise in which the reasoning of Florida Star could not appropriately
apply. 197 The Supreme Court also noted, "'[t]he Daily Mail principle does
not settle the issue whether, in cases where information has been acquired
unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, [the] government may ever
punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as
well."" 98 If, as he argued, McDermott was the "newspaper" and his
disclosure of the intercepted conversation was a "publication," then the
interception by the Martins would have been McDermott's "source," but
FloridaStar and Daily Mail would not settle this case.' 99 The court argued,
instead, that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Florida Star and Daily Mail
stood for the proposition that "regardless [of] whether the illegality is
committed by a newspaper[] [McDermott in this hypothetical] ...or by a
source [the Martins], if the newspaper [McDermott] publishes the illegally
obtained information,
the First Amendment may not shield it from
' 200
punishment."
Furthermore, the Court in Florida Star based its holding on three
considerations that were not present in McDermott's case. 20 ' First, in
Florida Star, the information disclosed (the name of a rape victim) was
entrusted to the government, and, according to the Supreme Court, there
were better ways for the government to prevent the public disclosure of that

193. Id. at 471-73.
194. Id. at 471.
195. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 538-39 (1989)).

196. See id.
at 469.
197. Id. at 471.
198. Id. at 472 (quoting FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 535 n.8).
199. Id. at 472-73.

200. Id.at 473.
201.
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information than by punishing the media for publishing it.20 2 In the present
case, however, the information disclosed was not entrusted to the
government, but was instead a private communication.2 3 In a case such as
this, which involves "'sensitive information' in 'private hands,' ... if the
government forbids 'its nonconsensual acquisition,' as it has in (the
of any information so
wiretapping statute at issue], 'the publication
20 4
acquired' is 'outside the Daily Mail principle.'
Secondly, the information published in Florida Star was readily
available to the public before the media disclosed it. 205 Therefore, punishing
the media in that case would not have served to further the State's interest in
preventing public disclosure of private information.0 6 In McDermott's case,
however, the intercepted conversation was not publicly available prior to
when McDermott handed over the tape to the newspapers.2 7
Finally, the Supreme Court applied the Daily Mail principle in Florida
Star because self-censorship might result from punishing the media for
publishing information released by the government.0 8 In the present case,
however, the government did not disseminate the information disclosed,
McDermott was not the "media," and "it would not be out of 'timidity [or]
self-censorship' for someone [like McDermott] to alert the authorities after
being handed evidence of a crime by those who perpetrated the offense [the
Martins]. It would instead be an act worthy of a responsible citizen. 20 9
To give further support to this contention, the court of appeals argued
that the 1972 Supreme Court case of Branzburg v. Hayes2 10 came very close
to holding that the First Amendment will not protect a newspaper who
publishes information illegally obtained by a source. 21' In that case, the
Court claimed, "no matter how great 'the interest in securing the news,' the
First Amendment 'does not reach so far as to override the interest of the
public in ensuring that neither reporter nor source is invading the rights 2of2
other citizens through reprehensible conduct forbidden to other persons."' 1
The expressly limited and narrow holding in FloridaStar and the Supreme
Court's statement in Branzburg, the court argued, did not lead to the
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989)).
Id. at 471.
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id. at 476.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535).
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Boehner, 191 F.3d at 473.
Id. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972)).
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conclusion argued by McDermott that the First Amendment prohibits the
punishment of an individual for publicly disclosing private information that
he obtained legally, but that was initially intercepted unlawfully by a third
party.213

The court claimed that "the illegal activity of the Martins, of which
McDermott was well aware when he took possession of the tape, [took]
McDermott's actions 'outside of the Daily Mail principle' and the Florida
Star line of cases," and further stated that there can be no strong First
Amendment right to disclose private information merely because the
information was acquired lawfully by the person who eventually ended up
revealing it. 214 The court finally went on to hold that because McDermott's
conduct in giving the tape to the media did not include speech, because the
wiretapping statute involved served to actually promote speech by
prohibiting and deterring unlawful eavesdropping, and because the Daily
Mail principle did not apply to protect McDermott, § 251 l(1)(c) was not, as
applied to this case, unconstitutional. 2t 5 The court did, however, claim that
this decision did not decide "[w]hether the [wiretapping] statute would be
constitutional as applied to a newspaper who 216
published excerpts from the
tape-who, in other words, engaged in speech.,
3. The Supreme Court Grants Certiorari, Vacates, and Remands
Just days after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Bartnicki
v. Vopper, the Court granted certiorari in Boehner.21 7 Largely "because of
the enormous public importance of the intercepted political conversations at
issue in that case," 2 18 the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and remanded the case "for
further consideration in light of Bartnicki v. Vopper."219 On remand to the

213. Id.at 474.
214. Id. at 476 (quoting FloridaStar,491 U.S. at 534). The court went on to note many other situations in
which an individual can be punished for disclosing information that he/she had received legally. See id. at 47677, 477 n.18. A grand juror, for example, may not disclose the testimony of witnesses that he/she lawfully
hears during a proceeding. Id. at 476. There are also laws prohibiting employees from disclosing trade secrets
they have lawfully obtained through their employment. Id. Finally, the court noted that the Copyright Act
prohibits the unauthorized publication of material that has been copyrighted, even when the publisher lawfully
receives the material. Id.
215. See id. at 477-78.
216. Id. Judge Sentelle dissented and argued that it is very difficult to draw the line between non-media and
media defendants. Id. at 483 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). He claimed that he "never believed that the First
Amendment protection of'the freedom ... of the press,' afforded greater protection to professional publishers
than it does to anyone who owns a typewriter, or for that matter than its protection of 'the freedom of speech'
affords those who communicate without writing it down." Id. (alteration in original).
217. McDermott v. Boehner, 532 U.S. 1050 (2001), remanded to No. 98-7156, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27798 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21,2001) (per curiam).
218. Frederiksen, supra note 172, at 19.
219. McDermott, 532 U.S at 1050.
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court of appeals, the issue presented was "whether, in light of Bartnicki,
Boehner's complaint state[d] a claim upon which relief [could] be
granted., 220 The appellate court, however, declined to address this question
and, instead, remanded the case back "to the district court for further
proceedings. 221 The appellate court found that Boehner could amend his
complaint to address "the constitutional issues now raised," and the court
the
felt that it "would benefit from having the district court pass upon
222
Bartnicki.
after
importance
new-found
on
taken
have
that
arguments
4. How Bartnicki Will Impact the Boehner Decision on Remand
"The ambiguity journalists face under Bartnicki largely may be resolved
by the litigation surrounding [this] dispute[].,, 223 It is unknown whether the
district court, on remand, will apply the test applied by the majority in
Bartnicki or if it will apply the "unusual" public concern standard
promulgated by Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion. 224 If Justice
Breyer's standard prevails, "more constitutional safety may be accorded the
press when the speakers are not private individuals or perhaps even
celebrities, but [are] instead government figures or officials of some kind,"
such as were the speakers in Boehner.225 It remains unclear exactly how the
district court will apply the holding in Bartnicki to the facts presented in
Boehner; however, it is very likely that McDermott's lack of participation in
the illegal interception of Boehner's conversation will ultimately convince
the district court to hold that McDermott cannot be found liable, especially
given the high level of public interest in the contents of the conversation.226
Boehner argues that the First Amendment does not protect McDermott,
even after the decision in Bartnicki, because McDermott is a public official
and because, unlike Vopper in Bartnicki, he knew who illegally intercepted
and recorded the conversation in question. 227 However, Frank Cicero, Jr.,
McDermott's attorney, argues that Bartnicki settles Boehner's case, and

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
NEWS,

Boehner, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27798, at *2.
Id.
Id.
Frederiksen, supra note 172, at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Klein, supra note 27.
Heather Forsgren Weaver, Appeals Court Gives Cell-PhoneTaping Case New Life, RCR WIRELESS
Jan. 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL 10369599.
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"'[s]ooner or later.., 22
this
8 case is going to get dismissed on the same
constitutional grounds."
B. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc.229
1. Summary of the Facts
Carver Dan Peavy, a trustee for the Dallas Independent School District
(DISD) who managed insurance purchases for DISD employees, did not get
along with his neighbor Charles Harman.23 ° In December of 1994, Harman
acquired a police scanner, which he used to intercept Peavy's phone
conversations. 231 During these conversations, which Harman recorded,
Peavy made threats to harm Harman and discussed his involvement in an
insurance kickback scheme. 23 2 Harman then contacted WFAA-TV and
offered to hand over the tapes of the recorded phone calls and to continue to
make more interceptions and recordings.233 Riggs, an investigative reporter
at WFAA-TV, met Harman at his home to discuss the matter and was made
aware of the fact that Peavy did not know about, or consent to, the
interceptions and recordings.234 During this meeting, Riggs stated that he
wanted copies of any recorded conversations, and he also "instructed
Harman to leave the recorder running throughout the entire conversation
and
2 35
not to edit the tapes so their authenticity could not be questioned. 1
Both Harman and WFAA-TV came to learn that the interception and
recording of Peavy's conversations was illegal; however, Harman proceeded
to intercept at least one more of Peavy's conversations.236 Harman was
subsequently charged with violating a federal wiretapping statute and pled
guilty. 237 WFAA-TV broadcast reports on Peavy's alleged misconduct and,
although Peavy's conversations were not aired,2 38 WFAA-TV and Riggs had
"used the contents of the tapes in other ways. They analyzed the tapes...[j
compiled relevant portions to be transcribed[,] [and] ...

made notes and

developed leads based on the substance of the intercepted conversations.

228. Id. (quoting Frank Cicero, Jr.).
229. 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).
230. Peavy v. Harman, 37 F. Supp. 2d 495, 502 (N.D. Tex. 1999), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part sub
noma.Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,532 U.S. 1051 (2001),
settled, No. 3-96-CV-2945-R, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21405, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2001).
231.

Id.
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Ultimately, the tapes formed the basis for the broadcasts themselves. 239
When Peavy brought suit under federal and Texas wiretapping statutes, the
district court granted summary judgment for WFAA-TV and Riggs, holding
that even though they had "disclosed the 'substance, purport, and meaning'
of the illegally intercepted communications" in violation of the wiretapping
240
statutes, the First Amendment shielded the defendants from liability.
2. The Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, Peavy argued that the First Amendment should not shield
WFAA-TV or Riggs because they did not just disclose the contents of the
intercepted conversations, but "procured" or "obtained" the interceptions by
encouraging Harman to intercept Peavy's conversations and by instructing
him on recording techniques.2 4' The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that neither Peavy nor the media defendants were entitled to summary
judgment on this issue because "a reasonable jury could [have found] that,
with the exception of the interceptions made by the Harmans prior to their
contacting WFAA and Riggs,... [the] defendants' interim conduct
constituted 'obtaining' [or procuring] the Harmans to intercept the Peavys'
conversations, in violation of the [wiretapping statutes]."2 42 Riggs instructed
Harman to record entire conversations, which could have led Harman to
record portions of conversations that he might not have otherwise.243
Furthermore, a jury could have concluded that WFAA-TV's investigation
and interest in receiving the tapes of the intercepted conversations
encouraged Harman to continue to intercept Peavy's communications.244 On
remand, if a jury did conclude that WFAA-TV and Riggs had "procured" or
"obtained" the illegal interceptions, the "First Amendment would not bar an
action against them for interception [because] [t]here is no basis for
on the one hand, and
distinguishing... between a person intercepting,
245
obtainingit through someone else, on the other.,
WFAA-TV and Riggs argued that they did not violate the antidisclosure provisions of the wiretapping statutes because their "broadcasts

239. Id. at 514 (citations omitted).
240. Id. at 514-15,518.
241. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158, 167, 170 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
1051 (2001), settled, No. 3-96-CV-2945-R, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21405, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 26,
2001).
242. Id. at 171-72.
243. Id. at 172.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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were based entirely on sources independent of the tapes," and they did not
actually use or disclose the contents of the tapes during their broadcasts.246
The defendants argued that "they should not be forever barred from
investigating all topics discussed in the intercepted conversations merely
because they first learned of those topics as a result of the interceptions. 24 7
Moreover, WFAA-TV and Riggs argued that their broadcasts did not
disclose the contents of the intercepted calls because most of the information
contained in the broadcasts had been reported earlier by another television
station.248
The court rejected the defendants' claim that they did not engage in
disclosure because there was substantial information contained within the
WFAA-TV broadcasts that had not been broadcast on any other station. 9
The appellate court held, however, that "the district court erred in holding as
a matter of law that... [the] defendants intentionally disclosed the contents
of the Peavys' conversations" because "a reasonable jury could [have]
conclude[d] that.., defendants did not intentionally disclose the intercepted
contents, but instead250 disclosed information obtained from sources
independent of them.

Furthermore, the defendants argued that their disclosure of the
intercepted conversations to WFAA-TV employees for investigation and
newsgathering purposes was not a violation of the wiretapping statutes, and,
251
even if it were, imposing liability would violate the First Amendment.
The court responded that this type of disclosure was proscribed by the
wiretapping statutes because WFAA-TV could "cite no authority for holding
intra-organization disclosures are not violative of the Wiretap Acts" and
because this type of disclosure was not one of the certain specified
disclosures authorized by the wiretapping statutes.252
The defendants contended that even if the wiretapping statutes did in
fact prohibit their intra-office use and disclosure of the intercepted
conversations, they did not intentionally disclose the contents of the
communications as required for a finding of liability under the statutes.253
This was so, according to WFAA-TV and Riggs, because "they did not
know, or have reason to know, the conversations were intercepted
illegally., 254 The court rejected this claim, however, because the defendants
knew that the information they used in their broadcasts came from
246.
247.
248.
249.
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Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
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interceptions, they knew of the circumstances surrounding the interceptions,
and because ignorance or mistake of law is not a defense to liability under
the wiretapping statutes.255
Finally, the court of appeals addressed the holding by the district court
that the First Amendment protected the media defendants from liability
because they did not participate in the interceptions or procure Harman to
conduct them.256 The court asked whether the First Amendment shields
from liability persons who knowingly disclose the contents of an illegally
intercepted conversation that they "did not themselves make[,] ... but who
did have undisputed participation conceming the interceptions to the extent
257
[these media] defendants did.,
WFAA-TV and Riggs argued that they were protected from liability
because they lawfully obtained the information contained in the intercepted
conversations, and, under the Daily Mail principle, the government cannot
punish the media for publishing lawfully obtained truthful information of
public concem without a state interest or need of the highest order. 58 The
court declared, however, that it was "quite questionable ... that defendants
'lawfully received' the intercepted contents," 259 and "' [t]he Daily Mail
principle does not settle the issue whether, in cases where information has
been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may
ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as
well. ,,,260
Furthermore, the court noted that the Supreme Court has declared that
while the publication of lawfully obtained information of public concem is
protected by the First Amendment, "'truthful publication is [not always]
automatically constitutionally protected.' 261 The First Amendment does not
allow a reporter or his source to violate the law. 262 Although wiretapping
could provide a reporter with newsworthy information, "'neither reporter nor
source is immune from conviction for such conduct ... [because] [t]he
[First] Amendment does not reach so far as to override the interest of the
public in ensuring that neither reporter nor source is invading the rights of

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id. at 183 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8 (1989)).
Id. (quoting FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 541).
Id. at 185 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972)).
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other citizens
through reprehensible conduct forbidden to all other
2 63
persons.
The court also discussed the appellate court's holding in Bartnicki v.
Vopper and distinguished that decision on the ground that, unlike Vopper,
who had not participated in the interception and had no idea as to who
originally intercepted the conversation, WFAA-TV and Riggs knew that
Harman had recorded the conversations and actually participated to some
degree in the interceptions.264 Since "it [was] quite arguable that [the]
defendants did not lawfully receive the contents of the tapes," the holding in
Bartnicki was not controlling. 65
Finally, the court held that the government has "a substantial interest in
protecting the confidentiality of private wire, oral, and electronic
communications ' 266 that outweighs the "incidental" burden that wiretapping
statutes place on newsgathering and reporting. 67 "The use and disclosure
proscriptions do not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
further governmental interests in protecting the privacy of
communications."268
The court of appeals reversed the holding of the district court insofar as
it held that the First Amendment shielded defendants from liability for "use"
and "disclosure" of the intercepted communications, vacated the district
court decision insofar as it held that the defendants did not procure or obtain
Harman to make illegal interceptions, and remanded the case back to the
district court for further proceedings.269
3. The Supreme Court Declined to Review Peavy
The Supreme Court decided to let the court of appeal's decision in
Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc. stand and denied certiorari.270 Comments made by
Justice Breyer and Justice O'Connor in their concurring opinion in Bartnicki
v. Vopper may provide some insight into why the Court denied certiorari in
this case. 271' The concurring Justices made it clear that, in their opinion,
Vopper was shielded from liability because the broadcaster had not
"ordered, counseled, encouraged, or otherwise aided or abetted the
interception.272 Bartnicki held that a reporter can publish the contents of an
263. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691-92).
264. See id. at 188-90.
265. Id. at 189.
266. Id. at 192.
267. Id.at 191.
268. Id. at 192.
269. Id. at 194.
270. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 532 U.S. 1051 (2001), settled, No. 3-96-CV-2945-R, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21405, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2001).
271. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535-41 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
272. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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illegally intercepted conversation if the information is of public importance
and was obtained lawfully; however, no case has ever held "that reporters
can actually intercept, or aid in the interception of, telephone conversations
without the consent of one of the speakers. 273
If it was not for the fact that Peavy and WFAA-TV settled their case in
October of 2001,274 the ruling of the district court on remand would have
been a crucial decision "set[ting] precedents that could have [had]
repercussions for the media for decades to come. ' 75 If it had found that
WFAA-TV and Riggs had procured or obtained the illegal interception of
Peavy's conversations, the court could have established the general rule that
a reporter can, and will, be held liable if he "merely knows the interception
is occurring and has contact with the third party making the recordings. 276
V. CONCLUSION

While the opinion in Bartnicki v. Vopper may not provide the media
with clear-cut guidelines for determining when a publication stemming from
an illegally intercepted conversation will be protected under the First
Amendment, the Court did establish one general rule that will provide some
measure of security to the press: "where the news story involves a matter of
public importance (as opposed to 'tradesecrets' or 'domestic gossip') and
the press was not involved in the original illegal wiretap, the First
Amendment always requires that the press be allowed to publish free of
277
governmental restraint or penalty.,
In the end, because the Court did not agree with the dissent, which was
prepared to allow the government to punish the media for disclosing any
information derived from any illegal interception, Bartnicki v. Vopper is a
significant victory for the press, and the media is free to continue to raise
First Amendment defenses to new or different situations as they arise in the
future. 278 The Court may shift and side with privacy in the future, but for
now, the media seems to be protected by Bartnicki v. Vopper as long as the
media defendant does not participate in the interception and the information
published is truthful and clearly of public concern.

273. Frederiksen, supranote 172, at 19.
274. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., No. 3-96-CV-2945-R, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21405, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 26, 2001).
275. Klein, supra note 27.
276. Frederiksen, supranote 172, at 19.
277. Smith & Miller, supra note 141, at 29 (emphasis added).
278. Id. at 30.

Taken together, Bartnicki,Boehner, and Peavy "represent a spectrum on
which the involvement of the person claiming First Amendment protection
varies. 279 In Bartnicki, the media defendant did not participate in the
interception and had no idea where the tape of the recorded conversation
originated.28 ° In Boehner, McDermott did not participate in the interception,
281
but delivered the tape to the media after receiving it from the interceptors.
Finally, in Peavy, Riggs and WFAA-TV knew the interceptions were
occurring and advised Harman about recording techniques.282 Although
Boehner remains unresolved and Peavy was settled before the district court
could reach a decision on remand, it appears "clear that the closer journalists
get to the end of the spectrum representing involvement in the illegal
recording, ' 2the
more likely they won't be protected by the reasoning in
83
Bartnicki.
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